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COMMITTEE REPORTS

The Natural Resource Subsidy Debate:
A Critique of Proposed
Legislative Action*
A number of trade legislative proposals pending in Congress address
the issue of so-called "natural resource" or "resource input" subsidies.
Most significant of these is H.R. 4800, the omnibus trade bill that was
passed by the House of Representatives on May 22, 1986. One section
of H.R. 4800 would amend the countervailing duty law I by expanding the
definition of the term "subsidy" to include situations in which a natural
resource is provided by a foreign government to its domestic producers2
of downstream products at a price lower than its "fair market value."
Several bills in the Senate, including S. 1292 (introduced by Senator Baucus), S.1356 (Senator Heinz), and S. 2033 (Senator Chiles), contain similar
or identical natural resource subsidy provisions.
The proposals are designed to address the activities of nations, such
as Canada, Mexico, and others that possess abundant natural resources
(natural gas in Mexico's case), and which sell or transfer those resources
to local downstream industries at prices above fully allocated cost but3
below the price at which the resource is available to purchasers abroad.
According to H.R. 4800, a subsidy exists when a resource is provided by
a government-regulated or controlled entity for "input use" in the foreign
*Report by the Subcommittee on Proposed Trade Barriers to the Importation of Products
Into the United States, ABA Section on International Law and Practice.
1. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
2. H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 135, 132 CONG. REC. H3038 (daily ed. May 21,
1986).
3. Some of the bills also address "removal rights" for natural resources; these are intended
to target Canadian softwood lumber pricing practices. Indeed, one motivation underlying
the bills has been to overturn the Department of Commerce's decision that the Canadian
Government's programs affecting its lumber industry did not constitute subsidies. Final
Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood Products from Canada,
48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983) [hereinafter Softwood Products from Canada].
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country at a domestic price that is lower than the resource's fair market
value, but only if, by reason of government regulation, the resource is
not freely available at the same price to U.S. producers for export to the
United States. 4 The amount of the subsidy is measured as the difference
between the resource's domestic price and its fair market value. 5 "Fair
market value" is defined as the price that would obtain in an arm's-length
transaction between a willing buyer and seller in the absence of government regulation. The following factors are to be considered in determining
a resource's fair market value: (1) its export price; (2) the prices at which
it is available in world markets; (3) the market clearing prices at which
the exporting country can sell the resource in other countries; and (4) the
6
availability to the exporting country of such other countries' markets.
Finally, H.R. 4800 requires that the U.S. domestic industry demonstrate
that it has been injured by the subsidized imports before a countervailing
7
duty may be imposed.
Enactment of natural resource subsidy legislation is unnecessary because present U.S. trade law, in particular section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974,8 already provides a remedy for the complaints that are at the
heart of the present proposals. Moreover, enactment would result in many
problems because the proposals have serious conceptual flaws and would
give rise to grave economic and trade-related repercussions. These problems, as well as the existence of effective legal remedies, are discussed
more fully in this review of the major arguments presented in support of
enactment of a natural resource subsidy proposal.
I. The Existence of Other Trade Remedies
Supporters of the natural resource subsidy proposals argue that no
present U.S. trade law addresses the urgent issues of foreign government
natural resource pricing and access policies. Thus, the proposed legislation is necessary to authorize the U.S. trade agencies to respond to the
challenged foreign practices.
As is evident from the natural resource subsidy debate and the language
of the bills, the proposals are intended not merely to remedy alleged
foreign natural resources pricing improprieties, but also to gain access for
United States manufacturers to the foreign natural resource at the low
4. H.R. 4800, supra note 2, sec. 135(a)(2), § 771B(a)(I). The resource must also constitute
a "significant portion" of the total cost of production of the downstream merchandise for
which it is used. Id.
5. Id. § 771B(b).
6. Id. § 771B(c)(1), (2).
7. H.R. 4800, supra note 2, sec. 135(b).
8. 19 U.S.C. § § 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
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internal price. An effective natural resource remedy is thus one through
which access to the natural resource may be achieved while, at the same
time, providing for the imposition of duties or other forms of trade relief
in the event access is denied. 9
A.

SECTION

301

Of all the potential trade law remedies, section 301 of the Trade Law
of 1974 can best address the access and pricing issues involved in the
natural resource debate. This view has been expressed by some of the
chief proponents of natural resource legislation, as was made clear in
numerous meetings of an industry ad hoc working group formed to study
the natural resource issue. Participating in these working group sessions
were domestic ammonia producers, an ammonia importer, and companies
involved in petrochemical ventures abroad. The trade experts of these
companies exhaustively studied the issue of natural resource subsidies,
including an analysis of current U.S. trade laws and the applicability of
those laws to the natural resource issue. The working group unanimously
concluded that "Section 301 provides a potentially effective remedy to
questions of natural resource pricing and access." 1 0 The working group's
report and conclusions were transmitted to the Industry Sector Advisory
Committee for Trade Policy Matters, Chemical and Allied Products (ISAC3), and the report was subsequently sent to various Administration officials in April 1985.
Some members of the working group believed that legislation should
still be sought because section 301 relief is discretionary. It is clear, however, from examination of the record in section 301 proceedings that a
majority (approximately sixty percent) of section 301 cases have been
successfully resolved by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 11 It is
also clear that section 301 is broad enough in scope to address adequately
problems of both natural resource pricing and access.
Section 301 authorizes the President to respond, inter alia, to "unfair"
or "unreasonable" trade practices of foreign governments that "burden
or restrict United States commerce." Upon the filing of a petition and
initiation of a proceeding, USTR may consult or negotiate with the offending country in order to achieve a bilateral resolution of the alleged
9. See generally Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, Foreign Government Regulation of Natural
Resources: Problems and Remedies Under United States International Trade Laws, 21
STANFORD J. INT'L L. 29, 74-78 (1985).

10. ISAC Natural Resource Study Group Paper, The Natural Resource Problem and
Potential Remedies (Apr. 22, 1985).
11. Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, in GEORGETOWN U. LAW CENTER/
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. Div., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS app. C (1985).
WINTER 1987
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violation.1 2 This approach is the most typical way in which section 301
actions have been successfully resolved. To the extent such negotiations
fail, the President ultimately may retaliate by imposing duties or other
forms of import relief, or by taking other action that adversely affects
merchandise exported to the United States from the foreign nation. The
President's action may be directed against all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis, or solely against the offending nation.
Unlike the countervailing duty, antidumping, and other unfair trade
laws, the range of unfair and unreasonable practices covered by section
301 is far more flexibly defined. The conduct that is at the core of the
natural resource subsidy dispute-the denial of equivalent access for U.S.
producers to foreign resources and the question of reciprocity-falls
squarely within the statutory language. That a remedy is available under
section 301 is especially clear when one examines the amendments to that
law that were enacted in October 1984, amendments that make explicit
the ability of the United States to attack the type of practices at issue
here. 13 For example, the law now defines the term "commerce" to include
"foreign direct investment by U.S. persons with implication for trade in
goods and services." The amendment also expanded the definition of the
term "unreasonable" to include acts or practices that deny "market opportunities" or "opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise" by
U.S. parties in the foreign nation. 14 These amendments were intended to
provide foreign investment and access opportunities for U.S. companies-precisely the concerns addressed by the natural resource proposals. 15
There are three additional reasons why natural resource subsidy problems can be effectively resolved under section 301 without resorting to
the countervailing duty, antidumping, or other unfair trade laws. First,
section 301 relief can be long term. Second, the ultimate forms of relief
available under the statute are far more varied than those available under
any other unfair trade law and individually and flexibly address the practices of individual countries. Thus, if access is denied, the precise forms

12. Although most proceedings under § 301 are commenced by the filing of petitions by
private parties, the President also has the authority to "self-initiate" such proceedings. 19
U.S.C. § 2411(d) (Supp. 111 1985).
13. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948.
14. Id. § 304(f)(1), (2).

15. The House Ways and Means Committee, in a tie vote (12 to 12), rejected a proposal
to place the timber "removal rights" portion of the natural resource subsidy provision under
§ 301. No such proposal was presented for the "input subsidy" portion of the bill. On the
floor of the House a package of amendments offered by Representative Frenzel, which
included transferring the natural resource issue to § 301, was defeated 79-338. See 132 CONG.
REC. H3088-92 (daily ed. May 21, 1986). The House had no opportunity to consider separately the question whether natural resources should be handled under § 301 instead of
the countervailing duty law.
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of relief sought by the natural resource subsidy proponents-duties and
quotas-may be obtained under section 301. Third, the time frame for
resolution of such actions in the case of nonsignatories to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (some of which are the focus of
the present proposals) is, by statute, approximately one year-substantially less than the time frame involved in countervailing duty proceedings,
given the numerous opportunities for judicial review of those
determinations.
It is true that, in the event bilateral consultations fail to produce adequate results, the ultimate relief available under section 301 is discretionary with the President. As noted above, however, some sixty percent of
all actions under section 301 have been successfully resolved through
bilateral consultations between USTR and the offending nation, or, on
rare occasions, the imposition of other forms of relief. By contrast, in
1984, only forty-eight percent of antidumping and countervailing duty
cases were successfully resolved. Included in the section 301 figures are
actions prosecuted against such countries as Canada on certain tax practices, Argentina on leather hides, China on certain restrictive import
practices, and Taiwan on rice 16-countries and products or practices as
to which diplomatic and political sensitivities are acute. Moreover, for
those cases not successfully resolved through bilateral consultations, the
President has authority to grant relief through a wide range of effective
remedial options.
B.

SECTION

201

Section 201 of the Trade Act of 197417 provides that relief may be
granted where increased quantities of imports are the "substantial cause"
of "serious injury," or threat thereof, to the U.S. industry producing like
merchandise. Section 201 is not directed at imports that are dumped,
subsidized, or otherwise "unfair." Rather, it is designed to provide temporary relief for an industry injured by fair import competition, in order
to enable that industry to adjust to increasingly liberal trade conditions.
In some ways, section 201 may appear to provide a satisfactory remedy
to the natural resource issue, although it involves significant problems as
well. The following are the major strengths of the statute.
Section 201 is a trade remedy mechanism already in place. No
congressional action is necessary for its establishment; and operation
of the statute is well-known.

16. See Trade Cases (CCH) Case Nos. 301-15, 301-24, 301-9, 301-43, respectively.
17. 19 U.S.C. § § 2251-2553 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
WINTER 1987
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Under section 201, the President has discretion whether to provide
relief, and flexibility in developing the remedies for cases in which
relief is granted. This type of discretion, to allow for a weighing of
interests, is necessary when dealing with the complex and delicate
issues of national sovereignty involved in the natural resource subsidy
debate.
Section 201 can address both access and pricing issues. Within the
scope of negotiations directed by the President, the lessening or elimination by the foreign nations of restrictions on access can be sought.
To the extent the countries prove recalcitrant and negotiations fail to
produce any positive movement, the threat of a pricing response in
the form of duties or quotas will remain.
Certain problems, however, are involved in the application of section
201 to the natural resource subsidy issues. The major problems are as
follows:
Section 201 is intended to provide only temporary relief. While the
statutory limit of relief is eight years, in practice relief is rarely imposed for more than three. A comprehensive, long-term agreement
for access may be difficult under the statute, where the threat of a
price response is thus limited.
Several practical problems are involved because no unfair trade
practice is at issue in a section 201 proceeding. The burden of
proof under the statute is high, and section 201 cases often become
highly politicized. A petitioner thus has far less control over a
section 201 action than under the antidumping or countervailing
duty law.
Relief must be imposed under section 201 on all imports of the
merchandise in question, from all countries, in a nondiscriminatory
fashion. Nations not engaging in dual pricing practices may thus
be subject to duties or quantitative restrictions along with those
that do.
A number of these problems are inherent in the nature of section 201,
whose very purpose is to provide temporary general relief to U.S. industries adjusting to vigorous international competition. Section 201,
therefore, is not amenable to amendments that would make it a more
suitable remedy for the natural resource subsidy issue, which requires
long-term and flexible remedial options, such as those provided by section
301, discussed above.
C.

AMENDMENT OF THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW

The countervailing duty law provides that certain domestic subsidies
may be deemed countervailable if provided, inter alia, to a "specific
VOL. 21, NO. I
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enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries." 1 8 The Department of Commerce (Commerce) has interpreted this language to mean
that government programs that are "generally available" or are available
to a number of different user industries in an economy without government
restriction on the universe of potential participants are not countervailable
subsidies. 19 This interpretation has been the subject of conflicting rulings
by the Court of International Trade. While in Carlisle Tire & Rubber
Co. 20 the court affirmed Commerce's interpretation of the statutory language, that interpretation was flatly rejected in dictum in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. 21 In Cabot Corp. the court rejected Commerce's decision in Carbon
Black from Mexico that no countervailable subsidy existed because the
government programs were generally available. 22 The court held that
Commerce should employ a case-by-case approach to determine whether
government benefits, even if "generally23 available," in fact provide competitive benefits to specific industries.
Meanwhile, in its recent preliminary administrative review of the Carbon Black decision, Commerce reconsidered its initial conclusion that the
Mexican Government programs were not countervailable subsidies because they were generally available. As to carbon black feedstock provided by the Mexican Government, Commerce now concludes as a factual
matter that there were too few users in Mexico for it to be generally
available. 24 Commerce thus receded slightly from the more extreme position in Softwood Products from Canada that if limitations on the universe
of users of a resource were due to the resource's "inherent nature" rather
than government regulations, it would still be considered generally available. Commerce nonetheless reaffirmed in general its use of the sector25
specificity test.
As another proposed legislative remedy, supporters of the natural resource subsidy bills have suggested overruling Commerce's decisions in
these cases by eliminating the sector-specificity test as a precondition to
the finding of a countervailable domestic subsidy. This action would permit

18. Id. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
19. See, e.g., Softwood Products from Canada, supra note 3; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination; Andydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg.
28,522 (1983); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty
Order; Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1983).
20. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
21. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
22. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed,
No. 86-279 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 1986).
23. 620 F. Supp. at 730-33.

24. Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; Carbon Black
from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269 (1986).

25. Id. at 13,271.
WINTER 1987
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duties to be imposed in response to various foreign government programs
that benefit the entire economy of the nation involved. There are numerous
difficulties with this approach. The major concerns are:
The proposal would violate the United States' GATT obligations
that require adherence to a sector specificity test. Abandonment of
that test could well result in GATT-authorized retaliation against United
States exports.
The proposal would be unmanageable because a vast array of "generally available" government economic programs can be said to benefit a country's producers, so that no clear line can be drawn between
government action that is countervailable and government action that
is not.
The countervailing duty law is mandatory and inflexible. After an
unfair practice has been identified and the elements of proof satisfied,
duties must be imposed. The statute provides no flexibility either as
to the fact or type of relief obtainable. 26 This inflexibility makes the
countervailing duty law unsuitable for handling delicate questions of
foreign government sovereignty.
The proposed elimination of the sector-specificity test removes any
guidance as to the manner in which the subsidy is to be calculated.
If the calculation involves a "fair market value" test, an "export
price" test, or similar methods of measurement suggested by the
proponents, the numerous adverse consequences noted below would
apply. If the measure of subsidy is based on some benchmark below
prevailing "world market" levels, the amount of the duty may prove
insufficient as a pricing remedy.
D.

AMENDMENT OF THE ANTIDUMPING LAW

In simplest terms, price discrimination under the antidumping law occurs when a foreign producer sells a product in the United States at a
price below that charged in the producers' home market. The duty imposed is equal to the difference between the home market price and the
U.S. price of the producer's merchandise. 27 To the extent home market
sales are made below fully allocated cost, however, prices of the product
in the United States may be compared with the "constructed value" of
the home market merchandise. "Constructed value" is defined as the cost
of all materials, fabrication, and labor, plus certain minimum amounts for
overhead and profit. Where the constructed value exceeds the U.S. price,

26. Some flexibility under the countervailing duty law may be provided through suspension
agreements. Such agreements, however, are very difficult to obtain.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
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a duty is imposed on the imported merchandise in an amount equal to
28
the difference.
In addition to the natural resource subsidy proposals, the Ninety-Eighth
Congress also considered amendments that would have changed the computation of the cost component in constructed value from the cost actually
paid by the producer for a natural resource, to the "fair market value"
or "opportunity cost" of that resource. 29 The new "cost" element would
have become the price the producer would have paid for the resource had
it not purchased the input from a government willing to incur opportunity
costs in its sale. The effect of this methodology would have been to
increase substantially the constructed value of the merchandise, and hence,
the ultimate dumping margin.
This proposal suffered from the following defects:
While the terms "cost" and "opportunity cost" sound similar, the
difference between the two concepts is not one of degree, but one of
kind. To redefine "cost" as "opportunity cost" in a constructed value
calculation substantially changes the concept of cost as accepted in
the international community. As such, the proposal is inconsistent
with the GATT.
The redefinition of "cost" would impose on foreign governments
a standard of business behavior that many private companies do not
meet. This redefinition of cost would effectively preclude a government owner of a resource from transferring the resource to downstream producers at any but the current market price. It is not proper
to penalize a foreign government for what would be commercially
reasonable behavior by private parties.
To introduce an opportunity cost concept into the antidumping law
gives rise to the same unpredictability of administration and impossibility of compliance found in the natural resource subsidy proposals,
discussed below. If "cost" no longer means "cost" in an accounting
sense, but instead "cost plus" some perceived increment, what should
that increment be?
The antidumping law does not provide a sound basis of relief for
proponents of the natural resource subsidy legislation. Relief under
the statute is mandatory, and duties are the only remedy. The level
and duration of those duties are uncertain. Moreover, the antidumping law does not resolve the problem of access, which is an important
goal of any natural resource proposal.

28. Id. § 1677b(e).
29. See, e.g., H.R. 3801, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 3 (introduced by Rep. Long); H.R.
4124, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. sec. 127(1), (2) (introduced by Rep. Murtha).
WINTER 1987
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II. The Natural Resource Subsidy Proposals
and U.S. International Trade Obligation
Proponents of the natural resource subsidy legislation argue that the
proposals are in accord with the United States' international trade obligations, as embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 30 and the GATT Subsidies Code. 3 1 Hence, they conclude, enactment of such legislation will not result in any retaliation against U.S.
exports.
In spite of these arguments, there is a very real threat of a GATT
challenge to such legislation, based on article 11 of the GATT Subsidies
Code. Article 11(3) enumerates specific examples of possible "domestic
subsidies," and specifies that such subsidies are those "granted with the
aim of giving an advantage to certain enterprises," and are "normally
granted either regionally or by sector." These references form the basis
for the explicit requirement in U.S. law that only domestic benefits "provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries" are countervailable.
In 1984, after close study, the Administration concluded that in light of
the sector-specificity rule, the natural resource subsidy proposals constituted "a drastic and unilateral departure from the internationally accepted
definition of a countervailable subsidy," in violation of GATT, and that
enactment of such a provision "would subject the United States to a
GATT challenge, which we would almost certainly lose. The result could
be GATT authorization to retaliate against U.S. exports." 32 USTR reiterated this view in congressional testimony. 33 Likely targets for retaliation
would be our own major exports, such as agricultural products.
Even if the natural resource proposals were to survive a GATT challenge, it would be a Pyrrhic victory, because foreign Governments would
then have every incentive to enact their own "mirror" legislation. As will
be discussed more fully below, the U.S. Government has engaged in
numerous practices analogous to those condemned by the natural resource
subsidy provisions, which could easily be the target of such mirror leg30. Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
31. Opened for signature Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.1.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in
AGREEMENTS

REACHED

IN

THE

TOKYO ROUND OF

MULTILATERAL

TRADE

NEGOTIATIONS,

H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., IstSess. (pt. 1)257 (1979).
32. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and United States Trade Representative William E. Brock to Hon. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways
and Means, app. A, at 6 (Apr. 3, 1984) (on file with the author).
33. Testimony of Michael B. Smith, Deputy United States Trade Representative, Before
the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee 3 (June 6, 1985) (on
file with the author).
VOL. 21, NO. I

COMMITTEE REPORTS

295

islation. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that mirror legislation
would confine itself to U.S. practices that are identical to those proscribed
by the proposals; rather, it may be directed at any U.S. government
involvement in the pricing of natural resources that the foreign government believes inappropriate.
III. The Natural Resource Subsidy Proposals and
the Accepted Scope of Government Activity
The arguments in favor of the natural resource subsidy proposals are
based on the premise that the development and sale of natural resources
are commercial activities, not normal functions of government (like the
provision of roads, schools, etc.). Thus, when a government engages in
dual pricing of natural resources (i.e., sells to local purchasers at one
price and for export at another), it manipulates prices in a way that
interferes'with the free operation of the marketplace. Such governmental
activity creates a subsidy to the favored local purchasers of the natural
resource, which should be countervailable under U.S. trade law.
This premise, however, conceptually differs from both the internationally accepted definition of a subsidy and the U.S. policy underlying the
development of American resources. 34 More specifically, governments
are motivated by broad general welfare considerations that may result in
behavior different from that of a private company. One means by which
governments have attempted to improve their nations' general welfare is
by developing their natural resources. The impact of such development
on their societies may be dramatic.
The fact that a government acts to promote the general welfare of its
citizens does not immunize it from the imposition of countervailing duties
under current U.S. law and GATT principles. But the international community has agreed-and the United States has supported the proposition-that such actions are exempt from countervailability if the benefit
provided is made generally available to all citizens. Both the GATT Subsidies Code and U.S. law recognize that to be countervailable, government
benefits must be sector-specific in nature. 35 Generally available benefits,
such as U.S. control of oil prices in the 1970s, have been defended by
the United States as noncountervailable. Indeed, the European Community accepted this argument and, in 1980, agreed not to initiate countervailing duty proceedings against U.S. exports of petroleum-based syn-

34. See generally Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 9, at 63-66.
35. See Subsidies Code art. 11,

19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
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thetic fibers, because low U.S. regulated energy prices were made generally
36
available throughout the U.S. economy.
Generally available benefits may take myriad forms. A government may
distribute part of the income generated from sales of a natural resource
directly to its citizens, or use such funds to provide roads, schools, hospitals, or food. Alternatively, a government may provide a resource that
it owns directly to its citizens at low prices or, by regulation, require that
the resource be sold at low prices. The Congressional Research Service
recently completed a study 37 that describes the many programs by which
the U.S. Government has encouraged and regulated the development of
America's abundant resources. The United States has done so, for ex38
ample, by selling power generated by federal dams at very low rates,
by selling inexpensive water from government river control projects in
the West, and by regulating the prices at which oil and natural gas may
be sold. 39 Few examples of greater magnitude exist than the historic land
grant programs (such as the famous Homestead Act) sponsored by the
40
U.S. Government during the nineteenth century.
By abandoning the requirement under GATT and our current law that
countervailable domestic subsidies be sector-specific, the proposals run
counter to the long-term interests of the United States. Since a vast array
of "generally available" government economic programs can be said to
benefit a country's producers, no clear line can be drawn between government action that is countervailable and government action that is not.
Using the examples cited above, if generally available inexpensive natural
gas is a subsidy, then water from government irrigation projects benefiting
agricultural products, inexpensive hydroelectric power produced by government dams, and investment tax benefits to corporations could also be
considered countervailable. At the extreme, as noted by the Court of
International Trade in a recent decision construing the sector-specificity
requirement, even public highways and bridges could be considered countervailable government benefits to their users, and "almost every import
41
entering the stream of American commerce [could] be countervailed."
36. See Bello & Holmer, Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a Lateral
Attack on the Specificity Test, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297, 306-07 (1984).

37.

CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH

SERVICE,

THE

SUBSIDIZATION

OF

NATURAL

RESOURCES

IN THE UNITED STATES (1986).

38. See, e.g., Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-381, 98 Stat. 1333.
39. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982); Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § § 3301-3432 (1982).

40. See 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
41. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F.Supp. 834, 838 (Ct. Int'l
Trade
1983). But cf. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal
dismissed, No. 86-279 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 1986) (rejection of general availability test as applied
by Commerce does not necessarily lead to absurd results).
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That the United States does not intend such a result with respect to a
nation's development of its natural resources was made clear in the recent
congressional debate on the extension of the contracts that would provide
power generated at the Hoover Dam at prices far below-market rates.
The bill reauthorizing below-market pricing of hydroelectric power from
the Hoover Dam passed both Houses of Congress by substantial margins.
The congressional defenders of the proposal argued that the contracts
would allow the government to charge enough to recover costs. More
fundamentally, they noted that throughout United States history, the role
nation's resources has never
of government in the development of this
42
been that of a profit-maximizing entity.
In short, the regulation and development of a nation's natural resources
have long been recognized by the United States as falling within the
legitimate scope of government activities, which should not be subject to
countervailing duties.
IV. The Natural Resource Subsidy Proposals
and Private Commercial Activity
The natural resource subsidy proposals require that foreign governments involved in a commercial activity (the sale of valuable resources)
behave in the same fashion as a similarly situated private party. Their
proponents argue that if a government that controls access to a natural
resource were acting as a private company motivated by profit maximization, it would sell its products at the highest prevailing market price.
It would not deviate from the market price by selling the natural resource
to local downstream industries at lower prices. Thus, they argue, when
foreign governments do so, they grant a subsidy, which U.S. trade law
should treat as countervailable. Such a "private business" argument does
not consider the basic economic fact that governments, unlike private
companies, are motivated by concerns other than profit maximization.
The proposals are also not supported by the "private business" argument, because they expect governments to behave in a manner different
from many private enterprises in making pricing decisions. Natural resource subsidy legislation goes beyond condemning sales below fully allocated cost. It also condemns sales that are above cost and that make a
handsome profit. Indeed, the proposed legislation would attack any sale
of a natural resource made at less than the highest current market price,

42. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H3310 (daily ed. May 3, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Jerry
Patterson, D-Cal.); id. at H3330-31 (remarks of Rep. Howard Berman, D-Cal.); 130 CONG.
REC. S9447 (daily ed. July 30, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Chic Hecht, R-Nev.); id. at S9452
(remarks of Sen. Daniel Evans, R-Wash.).
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i.e., the immediate short-term profit maximizing price. But the U.S. trade
laws have never been interpreted to compel enterprises, either private or
government-regulated, to operate at a specified level of profit, let alone
engage in short-term rather than long-term profit maximization.
This expansion of the countervailing duty law is justified by proponents
of natural resource subsidy legislation as a way to restrain the behavior
of foreign governments by limiting them to actions taken by private businesses. The assumption made is that only one market strategy is available
to a private company-that of maximizing short-term profits. This assumption is wrong because private companies also pursue other market
strategies. Consequently, in forcing governments to pursue short-term
profit maximizing strategies as the only way in which natural resource
products can "fairly" be sold to local enterprises, the proposals compel
governments to behave in a manner that private enterprises need not
satisfy.
In contrast to the proponents' view of private business behavior-quick
sales at the highest price-diverse market conditions and different attitudes toward risk and long-term growth may lead companies to pursue
radically different marketing strategies. A company with a cost advantage
in a natural resource-precisely the situation involved here-may forego
short-term profit maximization in order to trigger longer-term growth in
sales. A company may lower prices to selected buyers, or reduce prices
in order to achieve long-term supply commitments, all in furtherance of
longer-term growth. A company that sees a potentially lucrative new
market for its products may lower its prices to the infant companies that
are creating that market to help improve their chances of success and
thus enhance longer-term growth. These varied strategies are often adopted
by U.S. companies; indeed, they are required by the diversity of the
marketplace. Thus, it is incorrect to assume that firms profit-maximize
only in the short-term.
The weakness in the economic arguments made in support of the
natural resource proposals becomes more evident when they are applied
to vertically integrated firms. This form of corporate organization, in
which a single company controls the development of the input and also
manufactures downstream products using that input, is prevalent in
industries such as petrochemicals, which are at the center of the present
controversy.
While a "market" based transfer price may be one level at which
integrated firms set internal transfer prices to downstream divisions, it is
common to find transfer prices based on cost, or on cost plus some markup.
Even if a company does rely on "market" based transfer prices, the
generally available "market" price establishes only a ceiling, which is
often adjusted downward to reflect the efficiencies of vertical integraVOL. 21, NO. I
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tion. 43 If foreign integrated producers of natural resource based products
are legally compelled to set internal transfer prices at "market" levels,
they would thus be subject to extraordinary constraints that deny the
efficiency of vertical integration and have never been applied to private
companies in the United States.
In short, to penalize foreign governments for pursuing long-term strategies imposes limits on them that U.S. companies have never had to
meet. 44 That approach violates the foundations on which the countervailing duty law is based. Moreover, as discussed above, the definition
of the failure to reap maximum short-term profits on sales made abroad
as an "unfair practice" sets a precedent that could be used to attack U.S.
exports as "unfair."
V. Administration of the Natural
Resource Subsidy Proposals
The proposals' supporters argue that their provisions can be administered fairly and equitably, and that they pose considerably fewer administrative difficulties than do many other provisions in current law. This
argument does not consider the following problems, which show that it
is virtually impossible to ensure compliance with and predictable administration of the proposals.
First, in conjunction with present U.S. trade laws, the proposals would
place foreign governments and exporters in a difficult, if not untenable,
position. Under present U.S. law foreign exporting industries run afoul
of the antidumping statute if the natural resource in question is exported
at a price lower than the domestic price of that resource. 45 At the same
time, however, under the natural resource proposals, such industries would
also be committing an "unfair" practice (in sales of the downstream
product) if the "fair market value" of the underlying natural resource is
greater than the price charged in the domestic market. Compliance with
U.S. trade laws would thus be more difficult for affected foreign exporters,
however the natural resource is priced.
Moreover, the proposals are virtually impossible to embody in predictable, enforceable legislation. The proposals employ terms that are
vague or impossible to quantify. For example, they specify certain factors
to be used in determining "fair market value," including "export price,"
"market clearing price," and "generally available" price in "world mar-

43. See, e.g., C. HORNGREN, ACCOUNTING FOR MANAGEMENT CONTROL 372-74 (2d ed.
1970).
44. See generally Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 9, at 59-63.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).

WINTER 1987

300

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

kets." 46 Although understandable concepts, such terms are not amenable
to precise calculation. In addition, no guidance is provided as to their
relative weight, their mode of computation, or the manner in which they
are to be balanced against the domestic price of the resource. 47 The very
vagueness inherent in the concepts employed in these proposals underscores the fact that foreign compliance
may be difficult to obtain and U.S.
48
enforcement uncertain at best.
Vi. The Natural Resource Subsidy Proposals'
Effect on the U.S. Economy
The proponents assert that the natural resource subsidy proposals will
not injure the U.S. economy. They argue that, even if the proposals cause
an increase in the price of imported natural resource-derived products,
enactment of such legislation will provide substantial benefits to many
U.S. industries threatened by subsidized import competition. The price
increases in some imported commodities, they argue, will be more than
offset by a strengthening of U.S. industry.
Enactment of a natural resource subsidy proposal in fact would cause
an increase in the prices of many products in the United States, which
in turn would have a substantial negative impact on many segments of
the U.S. economy. First, virtually all of the natural resource subsidy
proposals provide an exception to countervailability in the event the foreign nation permits U.S. company access to the low-priced resource.
Where such access is denied, whether for political or other reasons, that
nation can comply with the proposals only if it raises its internal price of
the resource to so-called "world market" levels. In already cartelized
markets for certain natural resources, such as energy products like natural
gas and crude oil, serious economic repercussions would arise from such
a pricing measure.
46. See, e.g., H.R. 4800, supra note 2, sec. 135(a)(1), § 771B(c).
47. Indeed, as the International Trade Commission stated in its investigation of natural
resource pricing, "[f]or a nation that has no current viable natural gas export market, the
domestic price cannot be compared to the world natural gas price." U.S. INTERNATIONAL
TRADE

COMMISSION,

ING NATURAL

POTENTIAL

RESOURCES (FINAL

EFFECTS

OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS'
POLICIES OF PRICREPORT ON INVESTIGATION No. 332-202 UNDER SECTION

332(b) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930) xv (May 1985).
48. H.R. 4800, S. 1292, S. 1356, and S. 2033 provide an injury test, according to which
injury must be demonstrated by the petitioning U.S. industry before countervailing duties
based on foreign government resource pricing practices may be imposed, even though for
all other purposes under the countervailing duty law the foreign nation may not be entitled
to an injury test. While the provision of an injury test may mitigate the proposals' impact
in specific cases, it does not address and thus cannot mitigate the conceptual problems with
the proposals. Nor can the presence of an injury test resolve the practical problems with
the proposals, such as their anticompetitive effects, their negative market impact on American consumers and export business, and their difficulty of administration and compliance.
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Basic economic policy dictates that world prices of natural resources
should be reduced to reflect more accurately the costs of production. The
natural resource proposals, however, would directly counter this type of
positive economic activity. For example, where a cartel exerts control
over the production and pricing of a resource, the world price may be set
at an artificially inflated level. A resource-producing nation seeking to
circumvent the cartel's pricing discipline may do so by producing downstream merchandise and selling it on world markets at prices below the
market equivalent of the cartel price. This action, of course, works to the
long-term benefit of net resource-consuming nations such as the United
States.
The natural resource subsidy proposals undermine such attempts to
weaken cartel pricing because they define a resource's "fair market value"
by reference to its price on world markets or in other countries. Thus, in
utilizing "fair market value" to determine the extent to which the internal
price of the resource is subsidized, the proposals essentially mandate the
use, in cartelized markets, of cartel prices as the benchmark against which
the subsidy is to be calculated. Undercutting the cartel price is penalized;
reinforcing the cartel price is accomplished. This latter point is particularly disturbing because the proposals would have the effect of extending
a cartel's price discipline to countries not currently a member of the cartel.
Moreover, the natural resource subsidy proposals would not merely
lead to a lessening of competition in the market for the natural resource
itself, but also would have an obvious and direct adverse impact on American businesses, labor, and consumers. This effect is true whether or not
our foreign trading partners were to retaliate, as discussed above. As
Wharton Econometrics has stated, even assuming that the foreign countries that would be hurt by natural resource legislation would not retaliate,
the key impacts on the U.S. economy of implementing the legislation are
that:
Total real U.S. output (GNP) would be reduced by $79.7 billion
(1985 dollars) over the 1986-94 period.
Economy-wide job losses would reach 275,000 while net job gains
in the protected domestic industries would be at most 9,000.
Due primarily to higher fertilizer prices, net U.S. farm income
would be reduced on average by $889 million per year-over the 198694 period for a total loss of $8.0 billion.
The reductions in farm income and output would reduce the number
working on farms by as much as 41,000.
Real personal disposable income would be lower over the 1986-94
period by $39.9 billion (1985 dollars).
Consumer prices would be higher on average by 0.5 percent during
the 1986-94 period.
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The federal debt would be increased by $10.5 billion by 1994 due
to reduced receipts from other taxes and higher outlays (largely trans49
fers for, e.g., unemployment compensation).
If retaliation were to occur-the more likely scenario according to the
Administration and Wharton Econometrics-the negative impact of the
legislation would increase:
Real U.S. output (GNP) would be cut by $113.9 billion (1985 dollars)
over the 1986-94 period.
Net economy-wide employment losses would be as great as 385,000
while gains in the protected industries would be only 8,000.
Net farm income would be reduced on average by $2.6 billion per
year for a cumulative loss over the 1986-94 period of $23.8 billion.
Job losses in agriculture would be as much as 52,000.
Real personal disposable income over the 1986-94 period would be
cut by $58.8 billion (1985 dollars).
The federal debt would rise by $33.3 billion by 1994.
By 1994, the cumulative U.S. merchandise trade balance would
50
deteriorate by $13.0 billion.
It is thus clear that the proposals would have a negative impact on the
U.S. economy. Indeed, as the statistics show, the proposals would have
an especially noticeable negative effect on employment and farm income
in the United States, as well as the federal budget deficit and the balance
of trade.
VII. Conclusion
Enactment of the present natural resource proposals would be unwise
trade policy. Those proposals are based on an unrealistic model of private
business behavior and a restrictive view of the legitimate role of government in the regulation of a nation's natural resources. They are in conflict
with U.S. development of its own natural resources and constitute a
departure from accepted principles of international trade. The proposals
are anticompetitive in effect and, if enacted, wouldjeopardize U.S. trading
relationships and injure the U.S. economy. Most importantly, any amendment of the countervailing duty law, especially one as substantial as proposed here, is unjustifiable in light of existing trade law remedies-particularly section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974-that can already be used
to address questions of natural resource pricing and access.

49. Letter from George Schink and Bruce Lippke, Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates, to Hon. Sam Gibbons, 1-2 (June 6, 1985) (on file with the author).
50. Id. at 2-3.
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